Introduction
The electronic democracy to which this volume is addressed finds reflection at all levels of American government, federal, state and local; and its tools could be employed by any political actor -legislature, political executive, or administrative bureaucracy. These pages will address practice only in the national government of the United States, and only in relation to essentially bureaucratic (administrative) actors. The American Congress, while maintaining a remarkable data base giving the public near simultaneous access to all records of its actions,
2 has yet to develop regular electronic means for consultation with the public about its legislative agenda (contrasting sharply, in this respect, with the European Union, as addressed within.)
Individual members may have web presences permitting consultations with their constituencies, but these are idiosyncratic and at an early stage of development. More is happening in presidential offices. The Director of President Obama's Office of Management and Budget [OMB] , within days of the President's inauguration, published a memorandum entitled "CitizenCentered E-Government: Developing the Action Plan," promising that "Electronic government is one of the five key elements in the President's Management and Performance Plan." 3 conducted a web-based discussion of e-governance issues intended to inform the initiative, and, at this writing, its results can still be viewed on the Web.
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All this activity, however began too recently to be assessed in a paper principally written before President Obama's election. Rather, these pages will focus on a context in which the use of electronic consultation by "executive branch" actors engaged in policy-making has been developing for over a decade, and has reached a point of considerable, although not final maturity. This is the American practice of developing administrative regulations (subsidiary legislation). Initially developed haphazardly, agency-by-agency, it is now (albeit with friction in the gears) moving towards a centralized regime. 7 The practice is rarely consultative in the full sense suggested by the introduction to this collection of essays; as will appear within, while the public is given opportunities for input, and the input processes are transparent in varying degrees, online exchanges in the nature of a conversation or round-table are not imagined.
4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov/.
5 http://www.ostp.gov/ 6 http://mixedink.com/opengov/, visited September 6, 2009. OSTP maintains an on-line blog, http://blog.ostp.gov/, where further developments on these and other e-government issues may be followed.
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See the discussion in Part II, below.
I. The organization of the federal executive for rulemaking in the United States
A. The general procedure
It seems useful first briefly to describe the procedures by which regulations (subsidiary legislation) are developed by the federal bureaucracy, without particular reference to the developing electronic components of the process. Rulemaking affirmatively requires statutory authorization, and occurs subject to more exacting judicial review for regularity than statutes receive, but it is strictly an executive branch activity. American law sharply distinguishes between rulemaking and legislation. Congress legislates, but it does not participate directly in rulemaking. It has the possibility of disapproving its result only by enacting a new statute.
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While exceptions exist, virtually any regulation purporting to govern private conduct must be adopted by procedures at least as rigorous as those described in Section 553 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9 Section 553 sets the ordinary procedures to be used by any agency statutorily authorized to adopt regulations. 10 Other than a subsection enabling any person to petition an agency to undertake a rulemaking -a petition that must be responded to, and the denial of which is reviewable under quite permissive standards -it imagines rulemaking 8
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., creates a short form legislative process for such disapprovals, but as they must take the form of legislative action they require presidential agreement (or supermajorities in both houses to override a presidential veto). This makes likely, as thus far has proved to be the case, that such legislation will be successfully enacted only in very particular circumstances: when a with respect to regulation iss adopted in the waning days of one administration, but that remains open to the statutory process at the beginning of the next administration, in which both houses of Congress and the presidency are in the control of the other political party. Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 101 (1997) . 
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Statutes governing the procedures required of individual agencies occasionally require more elaborate, socalled "hybrid" procedures -for example, requirements of oral elements -or may invoke a more formal procedure described in the APA itself for "on-the-record" rulemaking. As these do not significantly affect electronic usages, they will not be further discussed here.
usually to begin with a notice of a proposal for rulemaking 11 published in the daily Federal
Register of government public notices. While the section itself is quite permissive respecting the necessary content of the notice, it is now understood that notice for any significant rule should contain the text of the proposed regulation and an explanation of its purpose, and that the agency should simultaneously make available the data or studies on which it may be relying in making the proposal.
As its second step, the section ordinarily requires the agency to give the public an opportunity to submit views and data -to comment on the proposal. The requirement is for an opportunity to submit written materials by a date certain, specified in the notice; agencies are free -but ordinarily not statutorily required -to introduce elements of orality into this comment process. 12 The APA imagines only one round of comments, so its text does not contemplate an opportunity to respond to the comments of others. With paper comments, perhaps simultaneously mailed to a single distant location, timely access to the comments of others was not expected and any access would be difficult. Agencies remained free, however, to consider late-filed comments and for important rulemakings there may occasionally have been efforts to reply to the timely posted and possibly significant submissions of others.
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A little-used chapter of the statute, more recently enacted, provides for "negotiated rulemaking."-the development of the proposal in a public procedure, through the negotiations of a small committee of public and private persons selected for their interest in the matter., "negotiated rulemaking." 5 U.S.C. § § 561-70. While the processes for identifying the occasions for negotiated rulemaking and constituting its committee may involve electronic communication, in the manner of all government notices, negotiated rulemaking as such will not be further 
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The exception would be for "hybrid" procedures requiring such an opportunity. Where "on the record" rulemaking is required, the APA gives the agency some discretion to use written procedures only. Section 553's third requirement is that the agency, after considering this commentary, publish a "concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose" as the preface of any regulation it finally adopts. Again, the language is modest, but courts have insisted upon relatively detailed explanations, including response to any adverse commentary that the reviewing court is persuaded to regard as having been "significant." Given the retrospective, litigation-driven character of this evaluation, statements of basis and purpose for important rulemakings have long and defensively exceeded the dimensions suggested by "concise general." Adopted regulations, with their statements of basis and purpose, are also published in the Federal Register; the regulatory text, but not the statements of basis and purpose, are collected in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Agency "soft law" -guidance documents, interpretations, general statements of policy, staff manuals, and the like -is excepted from the procedures of Section 553. Section 552(a), however, part of the federal Freedom of Information Act, does anticipate that such documents can significantly affect private conduct and indeed are intended to be followed by agency staff.
Thus, it twice provides, soft law documents may be used in a manner prejudicial to private interests only if published -either in the Federal Register or in an indexed compendium maintained by the agency.
B.
Presidential involvement in rulemaking Perhaps the most expansive early development of web-based resources for rulemaking occurred in the Department of Transportation, a cabinet department that, with its responsibilities for assuring the safety (inter alia) of all forms of transport, has become one of the government's major rulemakers. At an early stage in government's development of a web presence, it made a wide range of documents available and searchable on its website, accepted electronically filed comments, and developed "listserv" capacities permitting citizens to be informed of some filings of interest to them. Particularly significant was its development of a data management system (DMS) for all public documents held by the department, that was ultimately brought to the point of replacing the Department's paper records. Materials submitted or generated in paper form were promptly 25 scanned into the docket, since that was the Department's only comprehensive record. This meant that all material that might be associated with a rulemaking docket could be found on the DMS, providing ready access from any computer to all associated scientific reports, or comments already filed. Thus, conceived as an efficiency measure for DOT employees, the DMS also greatly enlarged public access to the materials of rulemaking.
Today, all government rulemaking save that conducted by some "independent regulatory commissions" must be conducted through regulations,gov, a website presenting a uniform face for all, with materials presented (to the extent they are presented) via a single federal data management service (FDMS) that the public accesses through that site. Regrettably, it would take a major effort to produce the DMS's capacities in the FDMS, and thus FDMS is and appears likely to remain considerably more limited in content and usability. For example, 25 DOT's standard, generally met, was to post everything within eight working hours of receipt. The transition to FDMS, for which posting is more complicated, has slowed posting a bit.
agencies are neither required, nor necessarily afforded the resources, to convert into electronic form materials that they receive in paper. Even for materials available to the agency in electronic form, the agency controls if and when they are posted to FDMS, and whether, if posted, they will be available to other agencies and to the public.. As a result, the FDMS cannot be regarded as a complete record of a rulemaking; nor is it a contemporaneous one
In 2008 rulemaking. As will become apparent, in addition to engaging the public, they also arm White House oversight and control over rulemaking.
A. The decision to undertake a rulemaking the order -a process that may involve informal consultations that will go unnoticed in electronic records -a formal draft analysis will be prepared and submitted.
Under the transparency commitments of the Executive Order, the fact of formal submission of a draft to OIRA, the pendency of its review, and a summary outcome are all noted and publicly available on the OIRA website. Should there be meetings at OIRA on the matter, the fact and subject of each meeting, together with a list of its attendees, will also be posted there. The draft itself, however, and any communications that may pass back and forth about it are not posted by OIRA. OIRA undertakes in the executive order both to limit the extent to which its consultations can be used by persons outside government for backdoor commentary, and to assure that written materials it sends to the agency will become a part of the agency docket, including an indication of changes made in the agency's formal submission during OIRA review. It is a matter of individual agency practice whether the content of meetings is memorialized in any way. While the draft analysis will be supplied to OIRA in electronic form,
whether and within what time frame these records find their way onto the FDMS is agencydependent.
Since the Department of Transportation had committed itself to complete electronic dockets under its own docket management system before the decision to have a single FDMS was taken, DOT's prompt posting of all materials is assured by the need for internal availability. That need puts into the rulemaking docket reasonably full accounts of meetings at OIRA, written materials coming from OIRA, and the like. The only question will be the fact and timing of their availability to the public -an issue that the FDMS system has thus far left to agency decision, and as to which the Department has thus far continued its practice of liberal exposure. The result is to bring these materials within the comment process.
Because the commitment to the FDMS is not a commitment to its use as a substitute for paper dockets, there is little certainty for agencies generally that materials like these will appear in it. That would require a commitment to translation hard copy documents into electronic form, entailing funds and personnel not readily available. Indeed, because an agency's decision to make materials it has placed on FDMS is binary -they may either be restricted to the agency alone or opened to outside access by both other agencies and the public -FDMS utility within government as well as without it, even as to materials that have been placed there, is significantly less than might be hoped for. Achieving the Potential reports that the "agency only" choice is often made, for reasons ranging from concern for pornographic content, to exposure of private business information, to compromising the internal deliberative process.
These issues are compounded by significant limitations on searchability within FDMS, and its general inaccessibility to external search engines such as Google.
Data assembly and availability
What is true for OIRA's interventions is also true for the internal agency documents that may underlie eventual rulemaking. Scientific studies and other materials that courts may require be available for public comment, and that agencies would find themselves compelled to release in response to a generalized Freedom of Information Act request, need not be received in electronic form. If received in paper form, they need not be scanned into the FDMS, and thus will not be found there. This will include even draft economic impact statements made in compliance with E.O. 12,866, which requires them to be made available for public comment in association with a proposed rule. There is no requirement that the statement be made an element of the FDMS accessible to the public and other government agencies when the proposal itself is posted on Regulations.gov.
C.
The notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity to comment Once a docket number is known, one may register in connection with that -but docket numbers are known only after notice has been published. For any more pointed registration for rulemaking notices, one must rely on individual agencies -and the current approach to centralized e-government has disappointingly tended significantly to dampen agency initiatives in such matters.
A one-way or two-way street? The chance to see and respond
Consistent with the general current permissiveness of the FDMS system, while agencies are obliged to accept comments filed via Regulations.gov, they are not required to make that portal exclusive. Comments may be filed directly with the agency, either in paper or electronic form. Indeed, some limitations on the Regulations.gov interface (one can directly submit a comment of up to 2000 characters, and/or attach a single larger file) make it likely that direct submission of comments to the agency will continue to be the dominant form. Moreover, even if a comment is filed via Regulations.gov, it requires an affirmative decision by agency personnel for that comment to find its way into the publicly searchable areas of the FDMS. These decisions are inhibited by concerns about privacy and confidentiality, as already noted, and in any event need not be timely. Comments filed directly with the agency require additional stepsif filed on paper, expensive and time-consuming ones. Achieving the Potential reports many reasons to believe that, at present, this process is slow when it happens, and incomplete.
The conventional view of rulemaking -that it is a process by which agencies inform themselves -is not compromised by these lacunae. That there is a single deadline for the filing of all commentary entails the proposition that responsive comment is not an expected rulemaking element. Indeed, the governing Supreme Court interpretation of Section 553 emphatically rejects the idea that rulemaking entails a back-and-forth process, consultative in the fullest sense. 30 Nonetheless, the remarkably expanded availability of materials promised by the information age carries with it the possibility of reading the comments of others much more readily than when doing so required a visit to a Washington office. In fact, many comments are filed before the stated deadline, permitting response. Most important, the "deadline" for commentary is highly artificial -it signals only that the agency's obligation to pay attention to what one might say ends. As would not be the case for a deadline in adjudication, it is not improper to submit a late-filed comment. Nothing prevents an agency from reading such a comment if it wishes to. It would not be surprising, in this respect, to see a gradual replacement of the "expert judgment" model currently underlying rulemaking by one that understood it in a more plebescitary, politically consultative light.
Decision processes within the administration
Internally, the availability of rulemaking materials in electronic form can considerably aid decision processes. Important materials can be on as many desks simultaneously as need be. 519, 547-48 (1978) .
Readers are entitled to know that the author, then General Counsel to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, was an author of the government's brief in the case.
electronic postcard -a considerable worksaving over manual processing. To the extent
Regulations.gov becomes a portal used for such postcards -and they are more easily entered there than would be more detailed commentary -this may be an important benefit. "Grassroots" comment campaigns of this character of course predated it. This is also the time when, for significant rulemaking, E.O. 12,866 requires submission and clearance of a final economic impact statement -a process thought often to entail a fair amount of pressure from the White House as to how contested elements should be resolved.
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Similar mechanisms and issues respecting transparency are present here as for draft statements at the pre-notice stage of the process.
D. Adoption
With adoption, regulations enter electronic databases associated with the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. Additionally, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act requires agencies to maintain an electronic library in which they can be found.
III. "Soft Law" -Guidance, the Web, and consultation
A. E-FOIA
With adoption of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act, federal agencies came under the legal obligation to make soft law instruments available in web-based "libraries," a practice many agencies had already adopted voluntarily. This obligation has since been reinforced by OMB directives and advice. 32 While not "consultation," as such, these postings The current preference for regulations that define results to be achieved ("standards") rather than specify the precise means to be employed ("rules") arms this phenomenon; once an agency has defined by regulation the results that must be shown, the regulated will enormously value advice from the agency about any (non-exclusive) means by which it has determined those results can be assured. But regulations generally, like statutes, invariably leave issues of detail and application unresolved, and one common kind of consultative practice is the advice letter, in which inquiring citizens or organizations are informed of an agency's interpretation of their legal obligations in relation to defined particular circumstances. This kind of soft law is hardly limited to technological regulation; the administration of tax, customs, and labor laws, among others, readily invite it. 40 In addition to publishing notice in the Federal Register that a draft document is available, the agency was to "Post the draft document on the Internet and make it publicly available in hard copy (or notify the public how they can review the guidance document if it is not in a format that permits such electronic posting with reasonable efforts)". Id. at., IV(1)(b). As of August 2, 2008, Regulations.gov lists no "economically significant guidance" for comment.
appears that agencies are to use their own web-sites for receiving comments (if electronicall filed) and providing a responsive discussion of its conclusions once comments have been Less formal, more immediate, and more intimate than the process for adopting regulations, it seems at least possible that these measures, for some agencies at least, wi in processes more genuinely consultative (in a public sense) than notice-and-comment rulemaking. The way in which Regulations.gov and the FDMS have been constructedlimitations that will take much effort to overcome, quite possibly not forthcoming -tend to reinforce the pre-existing reality that "consultation" in rulemaking was often a better descripti of agency relations with the White House, than with the general public. Those consultations occur behind essentially closed doors that the Internet world does not seem poised to open. Over a decade and a half ago, an administrative law scholar who had served as general counsel to the EPA (one of the federal government's most important rulemakers a e development of Regulations.gov and the FDMS) wrote:
What was once (perhaps) a means for securing public input into agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial re administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues. To secure the genuine rather than a formal show, of public participation, a variety of techniques is availablefrom informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, more formal techniques of advisory committees and negotiated rulemaking.
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"Notice" of proposed rulemaking appears in Regulations.gov only after all these processeswhich are not on the web and likely not captured in any electronic record -have occurred, and the compromises resulting from them have been secured. To expect much movement often to occur at such a late stage in the development of a proposal is irrational. To attribute it to electronic processes that are not universal, and need not -probably will not -reflect even the totality of public inputs the agency has received, compounds the problem.
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing paragraphs have attempted a descriptive, not a normative, account of the consultation situation respecting policy-making in the United States. One may see increasing commitments to transparency and interactivity as the Internet makes possible both the ready dispersion of knowledge, and broad opportunities for contribution. Whether, indeed, these developments will effectively enhance the experience and actuality of democracy in the affected communities is open to question. The model of Athens was unworkable even at the level of the eighteenth century nation-state, much less so large a community as the United States is today.
Electronic communication opens avenues for participation, but hardly solves the problem of dealing with number, and may indeed complicate it -both in an ordinary way (e.g., the technology gap between rich and poor), and in vulnerability to manipulations. We may confidently expect these developments to continue, and significant problems to be revealed and require attention as they do.
41 E. Donald Elliott, Reinventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490 , 1492 -93 (1992 .
